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Abstract 
 
Fifty years ago, Punjab embarked on its famous Green Revolution, leading the rest of India in 
that innovation, and becoming the country's breadbasket. Now its economy and society are 
struggling by relative, and sometimes even absolute, measures. Using the original Green 
Revolution as a benchmark, this paper discusses five areas of challenge and promise for a new 
round of agricultural innovation in Punjab. These are: complexity of the agricultural economy, 
complementary inputs such as infrastructure, switching costs (including risks), balancing frontier 
innovation and adaptation, and the relative roles of the public and private sectors. 
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Introduction 
In the 1960s, the state of Punjab led in the adoption of new high-yielding varieties of wheat and 
rice. Production of these new varieties required innovations in the use of fertilizer and water, 
which occurred in a complementary manner to the innovation in seed choices. Mechanization of 
several aspects of farming also became a supporting innovation. Agricultural extension services 
based in Punjab’s public universities guided farmers in their transition to the new modes of 
production. Furthermore, an infrastructure of local roads and market towns had been developed 
by the state government: these, along with central government procurement guarantees, gave 
farmers access and security in earning income from their produce. In the private sector, new 
providers of seeds and fertilizer, as well as farm equipment and equipment maintenance services 
also arose. All of these conditions together created what has been known as the Green 
Revolution economy. 
With the Green Revolution, Punjab quickly became the state with the highest per capita income. 
This ranking persisted into the 1990s, but underlying conditions became less favorable well 
before then. Gains in agricultural yields and productivity slowed, due to diminishing returns. 
While India began to grow faster after trade and industrial policy liberalization of 1991 and 
subsequent creeping reforms in other sectors, agriculture remained locked into the old policies, 
and Punjab mostly into the old equilibrium. The relative failure of Punjab to transition from 
agriculture to industry or to modern services means that the state still faces a major challenge in 
effecting this classical structural transformation needed for growth. This failure has been a major 
reason in the state’s decline toward the middle of the per capita income rankings of India’s major 
states. However, agriculture also desperately needs attention, even if it cannot be the only sector 
that must change to address Punjab’s economic problems. 
The reasons for not neglecting agriculture are several. First, there is the immediate problem of 
economic distress in the sector, concentrated among small farmers and agricultural laborers. 
Second, the current pattern of cropping and water use is leading to a rapid decline in the 
groundwater table, threatening complete ecological collapse of much of the state’s agriculture. 
Third, the Green Revolution economy has little or no room for further innovation that would 
enhance productivity and rural incomes. Any one of these reasons is significant, but put together, 
they imply a compelling case for considering how innovation in Punjab agriculture can be 
spurred.  
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This paper considers five challenges to effecting meaningful innovation in Punjab’s agricultural 
economy. It does not present solutions, but it is hoped that an analysis of obstacles to change can 
provide fundamental inputs into the process of seeking positive change. The first challenge to 
innovation is that, in contrast to the 1960s Green Revolution, a post-innovation agricultural 
economy will be much more complex, with a wider range of crops, requiring more sophisticated 
production technologies, as well as greater complexity in the entire supply chain.  
The second challenge is that this more complex agriculture will need more sophisticated 
infrastructure, since fruits and vegetables are much more perishable than grains such as wheat 
and rice (though even those currently rot in government storage facilities). Other complementary 
inputs, such as water, fertilizer, farm equipment and management, will also need to be provided 
in innovative ways.  
A third challenge flows from the first two characteristics of complexity and complementarity: the 
costs of switching to new products and modes of production will entail significant one-time 
switching costs, as well as new and ongoing risks. Future risks, even if partly covered by 
insurance, represent a kind of switching cost, albeit less direct than explicit expenditures on 
shifting farm operations from one set of routines and activities to another.  
The fourth challenge considered here is more subtle, in that it concerns questions of appropriate 
balance, rather than movement to a well-defined post-innovation future. Indeed, the challenge is 
to assess what kinds of innovations can best be implemented in which contexts or situations: in 
some cases, incremental innovations or adaptation of existing frontier techniques from elsewhere 
may work, while in other cases, frontier innovations spurred by fundamental research may be 
required. 
A fifth and final challenge is also a question of balance, in this case, of identifying the relative 
roles of the public and private sectors in enabling appropriate innovation. Fundamental research 
in seed varieties can be done by either the public or private sector, with the latter having more 
resources, but with incentives that may not lead to optimal diffusion. Innovations in 
infrastructure may require public-private partnerships, something India has been struggling with 
on many fronts. The issue of constraints imposed by current public foodgrains procurement 
policies also looms large. 
The five challenges just listed provide the framework for this paper, with each receiving 
attention in the next five sections. A conclusion then briefly examines an overarching challenge, 
one that affects all aspects of Punjab’s economy and society. Arguably, Punjab currently has a 
governance deficit that is severe even in comparison to other Indian states. This governance 
problem is partly due to structural factors (geography, social composition, position within India, 
and so on), and partly due to the state’s recent history of political and social conflict – itself 
partly, but not entirely, driven by the underlying structural factors. Punjab’s political economy 
also acts as an obstacle to innovation, much more broadly than just in the case of agricultural 
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innovation. It may be noted, however, that achieving some tangible innovations in agriculture 
may be the first step in overcoming some of the political economy barriers to broader structural 
transformation. Essentially, those with a stake in the status quo – the main beneficiaries of the 
Green Revolution economic system – may find that they can support broader changes, if they are 
among the first to benefit from innovation and change. 
 
Complexity of the agricultural economy 
Crop diversification has been part of Punjab’s supposed agricultural policy for several decades, 
but progress has been well below targets. For example, the second Johl committee on crop 
diversification in 2002 suggested that one million hectares be shifted from wheat and rice to 
other crops, especially pulses and oilseeds. The Punjab Agro Foodgrains Corporation (PAFC) 
planned to achieve this goal by 2007, but its web site (http://www.punjabagro.gov.in/pafc.html) 
reports only one-tenth of this area with alternative crops through contract farming. One potential 
issue is simply that diversification covers a wide range of possibilities. Pulses and oilseeds are 
each broad categories, and diversification also includes vegetables, fruits and flowers. Until other 
pieces of the supply chain are in place, diversification may have to take place at the farm level, 
rather than just at the aggregate level, requiring farmers to master production techniques for 
several crops at once. 
Aside from this basic complexity, the relative fragility, compared to foodgrains, of many fruits, 
vegetables and flowers during growing as well as post-production increases farming challenges. 
In these cases, specialization, while reducing complexity of production operations, may increase 
risks beyond what is experienced with foodgrains. Again, the different nature of markets is 
relevant here, with wheat and rice having an elaborate public procurement system that 
diminishes some aspects of risk. 
Sukhpal Singh (2004) describes a couple of examples of the challenges of alternatives to wheat 
and rice. Drawing on Singh, Kaur and Arora (1997), he notes that sunflowers had become a 
significant oilseed crop in Punjab by the early 1990s, but subsequently declined because of 
factors such as high water requirements, non-availability of quality seeds, and sensitivity to 
adverse weather conditions. Further, he reports (p. 174) on a study of floriculture by Garg and 
Sharma (1999), which lists every possible challenge in production, namely, “high risk of 
production, lack of weed control, high incidence of insects and pests, non-availability of good 
quality planting material and problems of seed collection.” It is certainly the case that some of 
these issues are due to lack of the kind of infrastructure that has grown to support wheat and rice 
cultivation, but it is likely that flowers (and many fruits and vegetables) simply have more 
complex and uncertain growing processes, especially for market sale versus home consumption, 
with the former requiring higher quality standards. 
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Sidhu, Kumar and Singh (2009) make similar points in considering vegetable cultivation. They 
note the greater perishability and production risks associated with vegetable cultivation, and 
based on a study by Birthal et al. (2006), they emphasize that high value vegetable crops may 
require high quality inputs, and greater knowledge of production technologies to be successfully 
grown. In some cases, more capital may be required, and in others, labor-intensive precision 
farming. These can be severe limiting factors on diversification, which has tended to be restricted 
in Punjab to larger farmers. 
Munjal Institute for Global Manufacturing (2013a) highlights some of the challenges in growing 
kinnows in Punjab: “During 1990s Punjab used to export kinnows to distant markets like the UK, 
Mauritius, Sri Lanka, Netherlands, Dubai but since then export to these markets has not taken 
place on account of substandard quality of the produce.” Problems of post-harvest infrastructure 
and marketing are discussed later in this paper, but the relevant point here is that farmers do not 
have access to the requisite knowledge for growing new seedless varieties, and achieving quality 
standards for export markets. Another aspect of complexity that this study highlights is the long 
growth cycles for tree crops such as kinnows. The study also notes problems of availability of 
the right kinds of seeds and appropriate resistance to disease for crops such as maize, moong and 
turmeric. These are not necessarily all problems that are inherent to these kinds of crops, but 
partly reflect the relative backwardness of research, as compared to the main foodgrains such as 
wheat and rice. 
Govil (2013) has elucidated many of the reasons for Indian (not just Punjabi) farmers not 
growing more pulses, fruits and vegetables, and these, echoing earlier studies, include the 
following characteristics of production of these alternatives to wheat and rice: 
• greater vulnerability to adverse weather, leading to higher risk of failure; 
• greater care and effort required for growing; 
• greater perishability and uncertainty with respect to quality and market needs. 
This last point is a complex one, since production decisions are tied up with market demand – 
farmers must deal with much greater challenges in deciding not only on what crops to grow, but 
also choosing varieties, and achieving minimum quality standards for varied markets. These 
challenges are not absent in the case of grains such as wheat and rice – ITC, for example, works 
with farmers in Madhya Pradesh to educate them on quality gradations in wheat that it purchases 
for making bread and biscuits – but the public procurement system tends to suppress such issues 
for the two major foodgrains. 
To summarize, innovation through diversification of agricultural production places demands on 
the knowledge base of farmers, as well as their risk-bearing capacities, that act as barriers to such 
innovation. Innovation requires dealing with complexity that can be an order of magnitude 
higher for farmers, in aspects of their production ranging from obtaining inputs, to operations 
decisions, to selling their produce. 
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Infrastructure and complementary inputs  
At a generic level, the problem of providing new infrastructure for agricultural diversification 
and innovation is well-recognized. There is a particular emphasis on the “cold-chain” for 
preserving fruits, vegetables and flowers that are almost without exception more perishable than 
the current staple crops of wheat and rice. The absence of adequate processing facilities is 
another major deficit in the farm-to-fork chain for many food crops. Physical infrastructure is not 
the only problem, and many studies highlight the poor quality of the institutions needed to 
channel alternative crops from the farm to the next stage of the value chain. From an innovation 
perspective, the problem is that individual farmers do not have the scale or resources to create all 
of this new infrastructure, without which innovation in crop choices may not make economic 
sense. There is a coordination problem, which can potentially be solved by large actors, whether 
public or private. The public-private issue is taken up later in this paper, but the coordination 
problem is worth noting at this stage. 
In practice, “contract farming,” which relies on large downstream private actors, has been the de 
facto institutional arrangement for providing the needed new infrastructure. Case studies 
illustrate the problems that have arisen for farmers, which have hampered further innovation and 
scaling up of new and alternative crop choices. Sukhpal Singh (2002, 2006) begins with a 
relatively positive account of the early 1990s entry of Pepsi into Punjab for crops such as 
tomatoes for processing. In this account (2006, pp. 175-177), Pepsi introduced new varieties, 
new production methods and increased yields as well as reduced costs of production for its 
contract farmers. The company invested heavily in food processing, and other companies such as 
Hindustan Lever also became part of this value chain. On the other hand, there were problems 
with managing the contractual relationships with farmers. These included inadequate technical 
advice, poor coordination, delayed payments, and even cheating. Many of these problems 
seemed to be associated with the use of intermediaries, such as large farmers or local companies. 
Farmers found themselves bearing greater risks than they had anticipated, and even faced 
competition from non-contract farmers who could purchase Pepsi’s seeds. This account also 
implies that shifts in the multinational firm’s strategy, along with political economy factors 
wherein government actors and other political entities did not see gains accruing to themselves, 
hampered the consolidation and spread of the initial innovations. 
Kumar (2006) provides a similar account of inadequate provision of complementary technical 
and marketing services, and inputs such as seeds, to farmers in the Punjab contract farming 
experience. His discussion covers a variety of crops, including maize and sunflowers, though it 
does not go into the same detail as Sukhpal Singh’s case study. Kumar also highlights the 
relative failure of government and quasi-government institutions such as the PAFC to provide 
their share of the soft infrastructure needed. Dhillon and Singh (2006) echo the need for better 
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government regulation in dealings between individual farmers and large agribusiness, with the 
implicit understanding that the pure market solution does not maximize social welfare – this 
would appear to be a combination of imperfect competition and externalities as a source of 
market failure. 
Recent studies (Munjal Institute for Global Manufacturing, 2013a,b) simply emphasize the 
continued failure to develop adequate infrastructure to complement and support innovation at the 
level of individual farmers. These studies document numerous deficiencies in hard and soft 
infrastructure for alternative crops. For kinnows, one study (Munjal Institute for Global 
Manufacturing, 2013a) notes the lack of adequate facilities for storage, grading and waxing, and 
for refrigerated transport. A case study of failures in processing infrastructure highlights the 
government’s complete dysfunction in building and operating juicing plants: while Pepsi in this 
case could just shift to alternative locations, local farmers were left in the lurch, and the 
government’s large investment was mostly wasted. Again, there is an undercurrent of 
government failure tied to political economy factors in this story. There are yet other 
inadequacies in the case of infrastructure for kinnows, including lack of local aggregation 
facilities for different grades and types of crops, inefficiencies associated with intermediaries, 
and lack of access for smaller farmers. In this context, Govil (2013) makes the point that even 
larger farmers who are trying to diversify into non-foodgrain crops can feel poorly treated when 
they participate in new value chains, since they bring in relatively small quantities for sale. 
Inadequate drying, treatment, and processing facilities, inefficient and uncompetitive 
intermediation, and inadequate storage and transport facilities all appear as deficiencies in the 
infrastructure, for crops as diverse as maize, moong and turmeric (Munjal Institute for Global 
Manufacturing, 2013a). Lack of adequate provision of inputs and technical advice, already 
discussed in the previous section, are another deficiency in the supply chains for multiple 
alternative crops. A second Munjal Institute for Global Manufacturing study (2013b) documents 
similar deficiencies in relative success stories such as wheat and dairy production, as well as for 
a range of vegetables. An additional deficiency brought out in this study is the asymmetries in 
information that pervade the value chain, contributing to coordination failures, greater 
uncertainty for farmers, price volatility, and inefficiencies in market clearing. All of these 
contribute to deterring farmers from innovating in their crop choices. The Munjal Institute for 
Global Manufacturing study discusses information technology solutions as ways of overcoming 
some of the pervasive inefficiencies, but these solutions also require significant up-front 
investments. 
To summarize, Punjab has not developed the physical and institutional infrastructure required for 
crop choice innovation and diversification. Individual farmers cannot create this infrastructure, 
which requires large economic actors – typically a mix of public and private – to participate. 
Connecting to the theme of the last section, the infrastructure needed is also more complex, 
sophisticated and expensive than what was created in the 1950s and 1960s, at that time largely 
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by the state government, but with the underpinning of a national food security policy (Singh and 
Kohli, 2005; Nirvikar Singh, 2016). 
 
Switching costs and risks 
Switching costs were first analyzed systematically by Klemperer (1987), in the context of 
imperfect competition. The term includes learning costs, transaction costs, physical investment 
costs (e.g., poly houses or drip irrigation: see Gill, 2015) and artificial costs created by 
oligopolistic firms, such as rewards for loyalty. In all these cases, the focus is on consumer 
switching costs, although the customers may also be firms that are purchasing equipment or 
other inputs from supplier firms. The latter case is most relevant for considering the case of 
farmers as potential innovators. Beggs (1989) and Salies (2011) consider innovation in the 
presence of switching costs, but their focus is on the incentives of sellers to innovate, rather than 
of buyers to adopt innovations – although the latter affects the former. 
In the context of farmers in a state such as Punjab, there are challenges for the providers of 
technology (new varieties of seeds, new production techniques) as well as for the potential 
adopters (the farmers), and furthermore for the buyers of the farmers’ output. As discussed in the 
last two sections, there appears to be insufficient investment in various aspects of the agricultural 
value chain, both upstream and downstream from the core production process of growing the 
crops. To the extent that farmers face switching costs, such as those associated with learning new 
production techniques (which can be more complex as well as unfamiliar) as well as those 
associated with learning how to market and sell new kinds of produce (again, typically more 
complex and difficult than the public procurement of foodgrains), this can inhibit adoption of 
innovation by farmers. That, in turn, can reduce investment by suppliers of farmers and their 
buyers, and do so in ways that lead to suboptimal outcomes. The idea here is that switching costs 
interact with market imperfections to create inefficiencies. It is useful to clarify here that 
switching costs are one-time costs, whereas many of the challenges discussed in the previous two 
sections involve ongoing costs associated with alternative crops, such as cold chain 
infrastructure, which will be costlier to build and maintain than the existing infrastructure for 
foodgrains.  
The uncertainties associated with new technologies and new crops are one source of switching 
costs, since these uncertainties attenuate and ultimately disappear with experience and learning. 
However, there are also ongoing risks associated with alternative crops. Some of these risks are 
inherent in the differential susceptibility and response of these crops to weather variation, insects 
and disease. Other risks are a product of government policies. In particular, it is well-known that 
the Public Distribution System and associated Minimum Support Price reduce price risks for 
farmers, and bias their production choices towards wheat and rice. However, removing price risk 
does not remove production risk, and a potentially better alternative would be some kind of crop 
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insurance, which addresses production risk, and which could be extended to a range of different 
crops. For example crop insurance tied to publicly observable rainfall levels can be customized 
for different crop choices by adjusting contract terms. Such insurance can also potentially reduce 
the risks associated with switching to new crops, by adjusting premia based on experience, 
perhaps with government subsidies (which are typical even in rich countries such as the US). 
In the case of Punjab farmers, some of the problems associated with crop insurance experiments 
in other parts of India, including unaffordable premia and high transaction costs, would still be 
present, but might actually be less significant, given the higher income levels in Punjab. What is 
important to recognize is that there is enough specificity and sufficient market size to create crop 
insurance products at the state or regional level, and Punjab seems to be behind the curve in this 
respect (Kumar, 2015). States such as Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat seem to be among the leading 
sites for crop insurance experiments, but the Punjab government could pilot insurance schemes 
for alternative crops rather than relying on the national government as it seems to be doing 
(Perneet Singh, 2015). Experience from other states (e.g., Cole et al., 2012; Clarke et al., 2012) 
can help in this respect.  
 
Balancing frontier innovation and adaptation 
The Green Revolution involved the implementation of what might be termed frontier 
innovations: the development of new high-yielding varieties of wheat and rice. Complementary 
innovations were required in terms of fertilizer and water use, cropping patterns, sowing and 
harvesting techniques, and so on. None of those complementary changes represented 
fundamental technological or even organizational innovations, in the sense that they represented 
pushing out the global knowledge frontier. This phenomenon of multiple adaptations or 
incremental changes surrounding a more basic kind of technological innovation is typical. A 
good example of this process has been the productivity of different generations of 
microprocessors, where there is a learning curve for each new major advance in technology, as a 
result of many small adjustments in the complex manufacturing process. 
In the case of Punjab agriculture, dominated as it is by wheat and rice, with cotton and sugarcane 
also being significant crops, the innovation process currently appears to consist of attempts to 
continue developing new varieties of these crops, through conventional hybridization 
experiments, as well as genetic modification trials. Some of this innovation is required simply to 
deal with new diseases, or pests that have become resistant to methods of chemical control. In 
other cases, it seems that frontier technological innovation is subject to diminishing returns. For 
innovators, such as scientists at agricultural universities, the kinds of research they pursue may 
be driven by risk-reward tradeoffs that favor these directions of potential innovation, despite the 
problem of diminishing returns. These directions are safer in terms of probabilities of success, 
and more directly of value since they provide improvements in areas that can benefit a large 
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number of cultivators. This argument has considerable overlap with the ideas in Christensen 
(1997), in which he argues that successful firms may under-invest in disruptive innovations. One 
can extend this possibility to include research in other organizations, such as universities or 
government laboratories. 
There is an additional aspect of this problem. The previous paragraphs highlighted the incentives 
of researchers, in terms of where they focus their efforts, with respect to crops and types of 
innovation. The status quo will favor incremental (but frontier) innovation in crops that are 
currently grown most commonly. However, there is the additional problem that research in crops 
that are not widely grown, whether it leads to incremental or discontinuous innovation, will 
require a multitude of changes at the farm level, in detailed adaptations of growing techniques, as 
well as innovations in other parts of the agricultural economy’s infrastructure and value chain, as 
has been highlighted in earlier sections of this paper. In other words, alternative choices of 
innovation effort by researchers may have uncertain payoffs, with that uncertainty depending on 
institutional factors beyond their control. In the Green Revolution case, some of the physical 
infrastructure (e.g., market towns and connecting roads) had been established in the decade 
preceding the actual introduction of high-yielding varieties.  
Yet another problem is that some of the adaptive innovations and adjustments in growing 
techniques for alternative crops are not rewarded within the scientific establishment. Compared 
to the Green Revolution era, there is a stronger indigenous scientific base, but it is arguably the 
case that the level of detailed understanding of complementary adjustments in farming practices 
that are needed to make a the core technological innovation successful – that is, the range of 
activities captured under the broad heading of “agricultural extension” – has not progressed in 
the same way as the core scientific research, and in some ways has even regressed. This issue is a 
controversial one, of course, and it is not restricted to Punjab, but is India-wide (e.g., Raabe, 
2008; Ferroni and Zhou, 2011, 2012; Babu et al., 2013).1 Furthermore, it is just one example of 
the deeper problems of delivery of public services – health and education are commonly 
discussed as examples of public sector failure in India – and public agricultural extension is in 
some ways doing better than those cases, especially given its unique challenges in the context of 
implementing complex sets of technological and behavioral innovation. 
The issues raised in this section are somewhat different than more traditional economic analyses 
of adjustment costs as barriers to adoption of innovations.2 The argument here is based on 
problems with incentives within organizations that produce innovations, and related issues of 
externalities resulting from the need to have coordinated efforts across different aspects of the 
                                                 
1 Yet another issue, quite different from the problem of distortions in directions of innovation, is the claim that 
innovation takes a back seat to pushing the interests of input providers, such as manufacturers of agricultural 
machinery: see, for example, Sandhu (2015). 
2 There is a large literature on the challenges of agricultural innovation in developing economies. For example, see 
Feder et al. (1985), Nirvikar Singh (1994), and Sunding and Zilberman (2001). A Punjab-specific analysis that takes 
a traditional adjustment-cost approach is McGuirk and Mundlak (1991). 
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production process, in order to have successful innovation. This suggests that the policy response 
is perforce going to be challenging to implement, since it will require higher-level interventions 
to overcome externalities and coordination failures. This raises the difficult question of how 
appropriate incentives for these higher-level policy interventions can be created, and this 
problem is taken up in the conclusion. 
 
Relative roles of the public and private sectors 
The Green Revolution in India was led by the public sector. National priorities for food security 
shaped policies and institutions for public procurement. The state government played a crucial 
role by providing physical infrastructure such as market towns and connecting roads. Research 
and other support for innovation came from public universities, and public sector financial 
institutions played a role in provision of credit. Finally, the public sector has been heavily 
involved in the production or provision of key inputs such as water, electric power and fertilizer, 
typically with significant subsidies. 
Despite all of this public sector involvement, the role of the private sector in Punjab’s agriculture 
has obviously not been negligible. This statement includes, but extends beyond, the crucial role 
played by private sector enterprise, in the form of efforts by individual farmers, large and small. 
It is difficult to quantify the relative entrepreneurial abilities of Punjabi farmers, but there is 
some formal analysis of their entrepreneurship (Sukhpal Singh, 2013), and plenty of indirect 
evidence of Punjabi farmers’ ability to succeed in widely varying locations, including traditional 
destinations such as Australia (Times of India, 2010) and California (La Brack, 1988), as well as 
newer ones such as Italy (Povoledo, 2011) and Madagascar (Sharma, 2011).  
The other aspect of private sector involvement is perhaps more mixed in its consequences, 
compared to individual farmers’ efforts. Indian agriculture has long been heavily influenced by 
powerful intermediaries, who may combine participation in credit and input, and even output and 
land markets, to earn economic rents associated with market power, in a phenomenon well-
studied as interlinkage (see Gill, 2015 and Indervir Singh, 2015 and the references therein). 
Market intermediaries and other private actors in the agricultural supply chain certainly provide 
essential products and services for the success of Punjab’s present agricultural system, but it is 
not clear that their incentives for enabling innovation are aligned with maximizing social 
welfare, just as, with imperfect competition, static resource allocation may not satisfy that 
optimality property. 
Given the foregoing discussion, as well as the issues highlighted in previous sections, it is 
reasonable to suggest that beneficial innovation in Punjab agriculture will not occur solely 
through the private sector. At an abstract level, the problems of asymmetric information, 
externalities, the public good nature of innovations and imperfect competition in various markets 
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along the agricultural value chain all point towards some public sector involvement in facilitating 
greater innovation, especially that which incorporates crop diversification. It is arguably the case 
that the state government can make targeted interventions that provide effective nudges towards 
innovation, as well as adoption and diffusion of innovations, even in the face of the severe 
constraints imposed by the state’s own fiscal situation, and the conduct of national food 
procurement policy. Some of the barriers to innovation have to be overcome by relatively large 
financial investments in physical infrastructure, but the state government can catalyze the private 
sector to undertake these investments by improving the ease of doing business in the state. The 
public sector’s focus can and should be on improving the knowledge available to farmers, 
finding ways to overcome their switching costs, and providing them with better insurance as they 
move towards activities that involve greater risk and uncertainty. 
 
Conclusion 
If there is a clear case for government action in the face of a suboptimal current equilibrium, and 
the pace and irreversibility of environmental degradation creates extreme urgency, why is change 
not taking place? In the introduction, the ultimate underlying cause of Punjab’s economic 
problems was described as a governance deficit. This is an India-wide (and perhaps even 
worldwide) problem, but Punjab faces it particularly acutely, compared to many other states in 
India. Arguably, this is due to its recent history of conflict, which has attenuated effective 
political competition. Without such competition, politicians do not have incentives to maximize 
the welfare of voters, versus that of interest groups. These kinds of rent-seeking equilibria are 
well-understood and extensively analyzed and researched (e.g., Kohli and Singh, 1999 and the 
references therein).3  
The outcome in Punjab of the 2014 national elections, where the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) won 
its only parliamentary seats nationwide in four constituencies in Punjab, illustrated the 
dissatisfaction of voters, but this expression was only effective so far in urban contexts. In the 
State Assembly elections in 2017, there was a transfer of power from the Akali-BJP coalition, 
but the AAP, which had been hopeful of winning, was ultimately shut out by the other 
component of the political “old guard,” namely, the Congress party. Transforming the Punjab 
economy into one where modern manufacturing and services have a greater role is ultimately 
what is needed, but that will be a difficult and time-consuming process, and dealing with the 
agriculture sector has to be an important part of that larger transformation, aside from its direct 
impact within the sector (Nirvikar Singh, 2016). 
As suggested in the introduction, the political economy argument is that those who benefit the 
most from the current economic structures in the state, which includes large farmers as well as 
                                                 
3 For a more detailed discussion of governance in India, and the importance of comparing Indian states, see Nirvikar 
Singh (2019). 
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business interests, must perceive that they have something to gain from agricultural innovation. 
At the same time, the state’s politicians have to manage the gains from innovation so that they 
are not inordinately skewed. Whether they wish to do this depends on the relative influence of 
voters and interest groups. To the extent that farmers as voters have to be convinced that 
agricultural innovation will benefit them so that they exert pressure on politicians to respond, 
disrupting the current suboptimal equilibrium may require external influences, from academics 
as well as multilateral agencies.4  
Past experience does not suggest that the national government is likely to play a leading role in 
providing the needed nudges for the beginnings of transformation, so Punjab is unlikely to derive 
any benefits in this respect from its place in India’s federal structure. Indeed, with the current 
state government being in effective opposition to the ruling national coalition, negotiations 
between the state and the Centre are once again fraught, as several news reports on GST 
payments and debt ceilings illustrate.5  
A more promising external source for catalyzing innovation in Punjab, albeit one that will face 
its own challenges and dilemmas in attempting to influence the state’s direction, might be the 
Punjabi diaspora. In the context of India as a whole, Kapur (2010), in his comprehensive and 
definitive study has observed that international migration has been an important mechanism for 
“the diffusion of ideas that have shaped India's institutions and policies.” Kapur argues that these 
ideas have had very positive influences, on balance. Arguably, though, Punjab has not derived 
these kinds of benefits to the same degree from its regional diaspora, partly because of the 
dysfunctional politics of the state, and, connected to that, a focus by many in the diaspora on 
righting past wrongs in the form of human rights violations.6 While that is a worthy and 
necessary objective, a greater focus on the future development of the state may ultimately be 
what helps on all fronts. 
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